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INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND INLAND
WATERS: THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERALISM
DOMINIQUE ALHERITIERE*

INTRODUCTION
Among the factors influencing the international co-operation on
inland water resources, federalism deserves specific attention. This
article will not only examine the contribution that federalism may
bring to the improvement of international relations in this field; it
also aims at determining the extent to which federalism may be an
obstacle to the development of co-operation at the international
level. The reverse influence, of international law on federalism, will
only be briefly envisaged since this reverse osmosis between international relations and federalism is a subject in itself.
By federalism we are referring to a form of government which
aims at compromising internal pluralism with external uniformity.,
Since every federal experience is original, it is often said that there
are as many forms of federalism as there are federations. It may
indeed be difficult to distinguish some federal states from a centralized state or from a confederation. Thus, if, for instance, we use
legislative powers over water management as a yardstick, the federal
government in some federations has extensive powers over this
subject-matter (Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, for example), while others
share authority in water management with ad hoc entities such as
river basin administrations whose territorial limits do not conform to
the limits of individual member-states. The Ruhr in the Federal
Republic of Germany is an example. Other countries, such as Switzerland since the 1975 constitutional amendments, belong to a
category of states which are authentically federal in other aspects
and are, at the same time, more centralized than non-federal coun*LL.L., University of Aix-Marseille (France); LL.M., University of Montreal (Canada);
LL.D., University Laval (Canada). Economic Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat,
E.S.A., C.N.R.E.T. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat. The designations
employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Unions concerning

the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
1. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 141-44 (10th
ed. E. C. Wade 1959); McWhinney, Comparative Federalism (2 ed. 1965); R. R. Bowie & C.
J. Friedrich, Studies in Federalism (1954).
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tries, such as Italy, where water is concerned. 2 A second category
includes federal countries like Canada, Australia, India and others,
where power to regulate water is divided between the two orders of
governments, central and local, with, in many cases, a division which
is extremely favorable to member states. This article will focus on
this second category of states, whether past, Switzerland before the
1975 amendments, or present.
The use of the word co-operation in the title was purposeful. This
article is deliberately restricted to situations where international or
interstate 3 co-operation resulted in a solution, whether through a
formal agreement or not. We will not deal with solutions imposed by
an arbitration, a judicial decision or by an act of a federal parliament.
The importance' of the subject may be demonstrated by the
respective importance of its components. More than one-third of the
world population is living under federal regimes, which include some
of the most powerful, developed, and populous of the world's countries, controlling a substantial portion of the water and resources.'
Many major international bodies of water are shared by federal
countries. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River basin, shared by
Canada and the United States, constitutes the most important basin
in the world in terms of water quantity (surface and ground waters)
if not in economic terms. The busiest river basin in the world, the
Rhine River, is shared by seven European countries, among which
three are federal states. Many other
international river basins are
6
shared by one or several federations.
The importance of international co-operation on water may be
best shown by the fact that water is increasingly at the center of
international disputes and at the heart of international joint ventures.
2. S. Burchi, The Italian Experience in Water Administration: From Centralization to
De-centralization, Working Papers of the lid International Conference on Water Law and
Administration, Caracas (February 1976), Int'l Ass'n. For Water Law, vol. 7, at 578-598.
3. We shall use the word interstate to designate the relations between members of the
same federal country whether the entity is called a state, a province, a republic, a land, or
whatever.
4. In spite of its importance, many aspects of the subject have not drawn much attention. While there are many books and articles on treaty-making power and federalism, and

much has been written on interstate cooperation, the subject of this article has only been
treated by a few authors. See the forward looking paper, G. J. Cane, Treatiesand Compacts
Between the Political Divisions of FederalCountriesas Sources of International Water Law,
prepared for the 48th Conference of the Int'l. L. Ass'n., N.Y. (September 1958). See also,
Van Alstyne, InternationalLaw and InterstateRiver Disputes, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 596 (1960).
5. Countries with federal governments include the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Federal Republic of
Germany, Switzerland, India, Brazil, Canada, Nigeria, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Venezuela.
6. The Indus, Niger, Rhone, Colorado, Rio Grande, Rio de la Plata, Amazon, and Columbia rivers are among the most important. Additional examples include the St. John, St.
Croix, Yukon, Amour, and Axios-Varda rivers.
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International co-operation can change the casus belli that water has
often been, into a warranty of peace. Mismanaged or uncontrolled
waters have always been a considerable threat to human settlements
while the rational management of the resource has been a pillar of
the brightest civilizations. 7 The unity of the resource requires that
rational management of international waters be achieved on an international basis.
FEDERALISM: A FACTOR WHICH OFTEN SLOWS DOWN
THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
Although international law requires that, in the absence of a federal state clause8 in the treaty, an international treaty concluded by
a federal government must be respected without regard to the distribution of powers within the federal state,9 member-states are, in
practice, important elements in the analysis of international cooperation in federal states. In some federations, the Federal Government must consult with member-states before entering into an
international agreement concerning matters which, under the constitutional regime of the country, are within the state's legislative
powers. The implementation of treaties concerning such matters is,
in some federations, left to member-states. Even in federations where
member-states have no constitutional power in the treaty-making
process, they are often politically important as pressure groups.
In the United States the constitutional power of the Federal
Government to make treaties is not restricted by state jurisdiction. 1 0
In spite of its wide and now undisputed power, which even extends
to executive agreements, the U.S. Federal Government has often
followed the policy of keeping the States involved in international
co-operation where, as with water problems, the subject matter is at
least partially within the States' jurisdiction. This practice illustrates
the political power of the States.
In the Labour Conventions Case, the Judiciary Committee of the
Privy Council of Canada decided that the Federal Government could
7. See the background papers to the Int'l. Conf. on Global Water Law Systems, Valencia
(Spain) (G. Radosovich, V. Giner, D. Daines, G. Skogerboe and E. Vlachos, eds., Sept.
1975); L. Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law (1967); A. Biswas, History of
Hydrology (2d ed., 1972).
8. This clause, after very disputed discussions, has not been included in the Vienna
Convention but may, of course, be agreed upon in a treaty. U.N. Conf. on the Law of
Treaties, 59-60 (N.Y. Official Records A/C 39/11, E.68.v.7, (1969), 6-16 A/C 39/11/Add.I
(1970).
9. L. Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution: An International and Comparaive Study, 260 n. (1971).
10. Ware v. Hylton, 3. U.S. 199 (1796); Missouri v. Holland, 242 U.S. 416 (1920).
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not infringe upon the legislative powers of the provinces in implementing international treaties.' ' Since provincial legislative powers
over water management are important, the Federal Government is,
with increasing frequency, requesting the consent of the provinces

concerned before it enters into an international agreement.
Like Canada, the member-states in Australia' 2 have the power to
implement international treaties within their territories when the
subject-matter of such treaties falls under their exclusive jurisdiction.
Although Australia does not have the problem of sharing inland
waters with other countries, the division of the treaty-making power
could have some significance, in the event that Australia would
decide to adhere to any international convention or code of conduct
relating to water quality standards. It seems that the practice is to
consult the state governments in matters concerning them before
signature of the treaty is authorized by Parliament or the Cabinet.' '
The Indian Constitution of 1950 gives the Union full power to
lead foreign relations, to ratify and to implement international agreements. 14 Thus, no compulsory consultation with member-states was
required, when the Union negotiated, signed and implemented the
Indus River Treaty with Pakistan.' I However, intense parallel negotiations between the Union and the member-states have always been
11. Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, Appeal Cases 326,
1937. There are, however, strong trends toward a reassessment of this case: La Forest, The
Labour Conventions Case Revisited, 12 Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 137 (1974). For a review of
Canadian federal treaty-making power, see the British North American Act 30-31 Victoria
C.3. (1867); A.M. Jacomy-Millette, L'introduction et I'application des traitds internationaux
du Canada 356; Pitch, The Treaty-Making Power and the Provinces, Constitutional Aspects
of Water Management (D. Gibson ed. 1968); Morin, La conclusion d'accordsinternationaux
par les provinces canadiennes t la lumiere du droit compare, 3 Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 144
(1965).
12. A. J. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations, 34-64 (3d ed. rev. 1966). See Australian
Const. of 1900, art. 51 (xxix). There is some analogy in this respect between Rex v. Burgess,
ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936) and Re Aeronautics, Appeal Cases 54 (1932), although the latter decision (applicable to the Canadian situation) was much clearer in limiting the federal treaty-making power than the former (applicable to Australia). See Clark &
Renard, The Law of Allocation of Water for Private Use, 4 Interstate Rivers 80-88 (Australian Water Resources Council 1972).
13. K. Holloway, Modern Trends in Treaty Law 195 (1967).
14. See Looper, The Treaty-Making Power in India, 32 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 300, 307
(1955-56); A. Blaustein & G. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World, art.
253 and Seventh Schedule, List I, art. 10 and 14.
15. During the negotiations of the Treaty, the chief engineer of East Punjab State was
admitted as observer: P. Ram Reddy, Informe sobre la India, in INCYTH-CELA, Seminario
de Administraci6n de cuencas interjurisdiccionales, 77, 101 (Mendoza, Argentina, Centro de
Economia, Legislacion y Administracion del Agua, 1976). Also, there was no compulsory
consultation with member-states when the Union signed agreements with Nepal for the
Gandak and Kosi rivers. N. Gulhati, Development of Inter-State Rivers: Law and Practice in
India 12 (1972).
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carried out before the conclusion of any major international treaty

on water.
The Argentine Constitution gives exclusive power to the Federal
Government on matters concerning international waters and for the
signatures and the implementation of international treaties., 6 Such
treaties are paramount to provincial legislation. However, since the
Argentine provinces have extensive legislative powers over the waters
of their territory, the Fdderal Government has many times considered it wise to consult them.' 7
In the Federal Republic of Germany, any treaty which affects a
member-state, Land, must be prepared in consultation with the Land
concerned.' I Member-states, Linder, also have the power to enter
into an international treaty, with the consent of the Federal Government, if the subject-matter of the treaty is in the exclusive or con-

current jurisdiction of the Lander.1

Water management and

development fall mainly upon the legislative power of the Lander.2 o
In Switzerland, the Constitution 2' and the constitutional practice
allow the Confederation to consult the member-states, cantons, concerning foreign relations on international waters. The cantons may
also sign international agreements of a limited scope. 2 2 In a 1975
constitutional amendment, the Confederation received the legislative
power to ensure the equitable utilization and the protection of water
resources, and to control harmful effects of water.2 3 The regulation
and administration of water rights remain basically under the cantons' jurisdiction but if the allocation or exercise of water rights
16. A. Blaustein & G. Flanz, supra note 14, art. 67, para. 19 and 28.
17. Subsecretaria de Recursos Hidricos de Argentina, La Administracion de Cuencas
Hidricasen la ExperienciaArgentina, Int'l. Ass'n. for Water L., supra note 2, at 673, 684-85,
687-90.
18. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany art. 2, para. 2; L. Wildhaber, supra
note 9, at 302-10.
19. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany art. 32, para. 3.
20. The Federal Government is limited in this field to regulation in very general terms
(frame-laws or skeleton provisions), Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 75,
para. 4, while the residual powers benefit the Lander. Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, art. 70, para. 1. Strong trends toward greater centralization seem, however, to
have recently affected the distribution of powers relating to environmental and natural
resources management. See Cole, West German Federalism Revisited, 23 Am. J. Comp. L.
325 (1975). Thus, in April 1972, article 74, para. 24, of the Basic Law was amended to
include in the catalogue of concurrent legislative powers (with federal paramountcy in case
of conflict) the disposal of waste.
21. Aubert, Traitt de Droit constitutionnel suisse, 1 Mdmoires de l'Universite de Neuchitel no. 30 (1967); A. Favre, Droit constitutionnel suisse (2d ed., 1970). Blaustein &
Flanz, supra note 14. NA
22. Art. 9, 85 (para. 5) 102 (para. 7) de la Constitution, Loi sur la protection des eaux,
Feuille feddrale 1971, 11, 909, art. 12.
23. Arrt6 f6d6ral concernant une r6vision de la constitution dans le domaine de l'6conomie des eaux (20 June 1975).
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affect international relations, the Confederation should act in cooperation with the cantons concerned. Prior to this provision, the
Confederation had some difficulties in implementing international
conventions relating to a subject coming under the jurisdiction of the
cantons. For example, difficulties were experienced in the implementation of the international convention on the abstraction of water
from Lake Constance.2 4
Swiss cantons may be involved in the treaty making process in
four different ways: consultation on federal treaties, direct cantonal
co-operation with foreign entities, exercise of the cantonal agreement-making power, and participation of cantonal representatives in
certain federal delegations. 2 I
From this brief comparative review, it may be concluded that in
most federations, member-states are involved in the treaty-making
process either because of the requirements of the Constitution itself,
or of the courts, or through the willingness of the Federal Government, which considers it politically wise to consult or to receive prior
agreement from the states concerned. In any case, a federal government is less at ease in the process of international co-operation than
an unitary state would be, due to the involvement of member-states
in the co-operation process. Member-states have often opposed international treaties on water matters; at times providing a pretext for a
federation 2to postpone the ratification of an international treaty or
agreement. 6
For instance, in 1961 the Treaty on the Columbia was signed by
the Governments of Canada and the United States. However, due to
the opposition of British Columbia, Canada delayed ratification of
the treaty by three and a half years. 2 7 Ratification was possible only
after the Federal Government had signed an agreement with the
Province of British Columbia.2 8 Another example of federalism obstructing international co-operation may be found in Mexican-U.S.
relations on the Colorado River. 2 9 In 1938 the seven American
24. RO 1967, 1605; read the very enlightening message of the Federal Council delivered
to the Federal Assembly and aimed to introduce and to explain the proposed constitutional
amendment: Message du Conseil f6d6ral h l'Assembl6e fdd6rale concernant une r6vision de la
constitution dans le domaine de l'6conomie hydraulique (art. 24 bis et 24 quater), 13
September 1972, Feuille f~d6rale 1972 II, 1144.
25. Wildhaber, supra note 9, at 213.

26. See note 47 infra.
27. Johnson, The Columbia Basin, The Law of International Drainage Basins 167, 223-27
(A. Garretson, R. Hayton, & C. Olmstead, eds., 1967).
28. Canadian Dept's of External Aff. and Northern Aff. and Nat. Res., The Columbia
River Protocol and Related Documents, 100, 107 (1964).
29. Meyer, The Colorado Basin in Garretson, Hayton & Olmstead, supra note 27, at 486,

554-55.
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states of the Colorado River basin formed a committee which put
considerable pressure on the U.S. Government to maintain a hard
line attitude in its negotiations with Mexico. In the United States
state opposition has contributed to the defeat or to the postponement of many an international treaty. 3 I For example, the Fraser
River Salmon Fisheries Treaty and the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention of 1946 were delayed because of state opposition, as was the
treaty with Mexico for the allocation of waters of the Rio Grande.
One solution to these difficulties is for the federal government to
negotiate an agreement with its member-states, prior to the international agreement. The Federal Government of Canada, having
learned from the Columbia experience, followed this practice for the
Great Lakes. Prior to signing an agreement with the United States on
Great Lakes Water Quality the Canadian Federal Government signed
a memorandum of agreement with the Government of the Province
of Ontario. In the memorandum, Ontario agreed to assist the Federal
Government in implementing Canada's obligations under the international agreement and a Board of Review composed of three members appointed by Canada and three by Ontario was established.
Consultation was also provided for:
Prior to the execution of the international agreement or of any
amendment thereto, Canada will consult Ontario with respect to any
aspect of the international agreement or the amendment, as the case
may be, that affects Ontario or the implementation of which may
affect Ontario. 3
In federations where member-states have extensive powers, another solution, to avoid problems in the implementation of international agreements, could be provided by the involvement of the
member-states at an earlier stage in the co-operation process. The
U.S.-Canada agreement of 1972 on Great Lakes Water Quality invites
the International Joint Commission to establish a Great Lakes Water
Quality Board, composed of an equal number of members from
Canada and the United States, including representation from each of
the state and provincial governments. In Canada, consultative federalprovincial committees were established in international river basins,
such as in the case of the Saint John River. 3 2
A third solution may be found in the exercising of limited treatymaking powers by the member-states of a federation, thus permitting
a less rigid and less formal approach to solving limited conflicts or
30. F. L. Zimmermann & M. Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 1925, 77 (1951).
31. The agreement may be obtained from Environment Canada, Ottawa.
32. Environment Canada, The Canada Water Act, Annual Report 1973-74, 3 (1974).
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problems concerning international waters. A case in point was the
agreement concluded by the Province of Ontario with the states of
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio on the fisheries of Lake Erie. 3
Other examples are the agreements concluded by Manitoba with the
American municipality of Neche, North Dakota, undertaking to
supply certain municipalities of southern Manitoba with drinking
water 3 4 and a North Dakotan drainage board and a Canadian municipality agreeing to the construction of drainage works by the board in
Canada.3 1 This limited treaty-making power of the Canadian provinces is sometimes exercised after a specific authorization has been
obtained from the Federal Parliament. 3 6
Swiss cantons maintain regular contacts with foreign authorities
on limited regional water problems. 3 1 In 1974 about 125 cantonal
agreements with foreign states were still in force, out of which five
were agreements between the canton of Basel-Stadt and German
borderline municipalities concerning water pollution.3 8 Many other
agreements concerning drainage, sewage and pollution control have
been signed with foreign municipalities.3 9
Although such practices may generally facilitate international cooperation, they sometimes put the federation in an embarrassing
position. This was recently the case when British Columbia concluded an agreement with the City of Seattle on the utilization of the
waters of the Skagit River. 4" For this reason some federations require specific approval of the federal government before memberstates are allowed to concluded limited international agreements.
Agreements on Lake Constance are classic examples of formal participation by the member-states of a federation in the treaty-making
process under federal control, as illustrated by the 1893 Convention
33. The agreement lasted from 1931 to 1937. A. E. Gottlieb, Canadian Treaty-Making 25

(1968).
34. Atkey, The Role of the Provinces in International Affairs, 26 Int'l.'J. 249, 259

(1970).
35. The decision McHenry County et al v. Brady, 37 N.D. 29, 163 N.W. 540 (1917)
considered that this type of agreement did not require national consent; see also Buffalo v.
Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority, 277 N.Y. 292 (1938).

36. Stat. of Canada, c. 23 (1958); c. 9 (1966-67); c. 51 (1959); construction of bridges
over international rivers.
37. Wildhaber, External Relations of the Swiss Cantons, 12 Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 211, 215

(1974); the author quotes many examples such as the exchange of information concerning
emissions from the planned nuclear plant in Kaiseraugst (Aargau) with the German land of
Baden Wurttenberg, direct talks between German and Swiss borderline municipalities to
reduce pollution from the rubbish dump of the German town of Waldshut.
38. Id. at 217.

39. Id. at 218.
40. N. A. Swainson, The Evolution of the CanadianPosition on the InternationalDevelopment of the Columbia River: A Study in Politicaland Administrative Behavior 635, Dec.
1973 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford).
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between Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Liechenstein and the Lander
of Bavaria, Wiirttenberg and Baden, 4 or the 1960 Convention between the Land of Baden-Wtirttenberg, the Free State of Bavaria, the
Republic of Austria and the Swiss Confederation on the Protection
of Lake Constance against pollution.4 2 The Standing International
Committee established under the latter treaty is composed of representatives of the parties, including representatives from the German
Lander concerned. 4 3 In other cases, a member-state may conclude
an international convention with a foreign state in which convention
the federal government is also a party. 4 4
Such practices often favor international co-operation, by making
the procedure less formal and accelerating the treaty-making process.
However, since, at the member-state level, local interests are more
strongly perceived, they are more likely to hinder the co-operative
process than when the federal government alone is involved. In addition, incentives for international co-operation, such as international
image, are generally more effective at the federal than at the member-state level.' I In any case, the fact that member-states are allowed
to conclude international agreements does not limit the power of the
federal state. Therefore, the power of member-states to conclude
international agreements appears to complement the federal powera complement which generally has beneficial effects on international
co-operation.
International co-operation will be better fostered by the federal
structure of the parties when an international treaty serves a federal
government to extend its powers within its own country. In other
words, federalism may be a factor enhancing co-operation when it
41. Swiss Confederation, Federal Chancellery, 14 Recueji Systmatique des Lois et
Ordonnances212 (1848-1947).
42. U.N., Legis. Ser. ST/LEGISER.B/12, treaty no. 127.
43. Other examples of the direct involvement of a German Land in an international
agreement relating to water can be found: Agreement Concerning the Austrian Bavarian

Hydroelectric Company (Bavaria-Austria), 16 October 1950, U.N. Legis. Ser. treaty no. 137;
Agreement Concerning the Diversion of Water in the Rissbach, Diinauh and Wakchen Districts, 29 June 1948, U.N. Legis. Ser. treaty no. 136 (Bavaria-Austria); State Treaty Concerning the Construction of Hydroelectric Power Installations on the Our, 10 July 1958
(Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Luxembourg), U.N. Legis. Ser. treaty no. 202; State Treaty
Concerning the Construction of a Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Sauer at Rosport/
Ralingen, 25 April 1950 (Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Luxembourg), U.N. Legis. Ser.
treaty no. 201.
44. Agreement Concerning the Danube Power Plant and Jochenstein Joint Stock Company, 13 February 1952 (Austria-Federal Republic of Germany and Bavaria), U.N. Legis.
Ser. treaty no. .138.
45. The lack of good will from a member-state to cooperate at the international level will
affect the image of the federal state as a whole rather than the image of the member-state
alone since, on the international stage, federal governments generally are considered responsible for the acts of member-states.
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allows international relations on water to become an instrument of
national policy.
International relations have always been an instrument of national
policies. 4 6 An international treaty may, although to a very limited
extent, give a final pretext to a federal government to implement a
policy that it would not or could not adopt in the absence of a
treaty.
In many federal countries, such as in the U.S.A., constitutional
provisions or judicial decisions give the federal government exclusive
power to legislate in order to implement international treaties, even
when the international treaties relate to matters which, according to
the constitutional division of powers, fall exclusively under the legislative authority of member-states. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the federal power to implement treaties relating to matters
within member-states' jurisdiction is concurrent with the memberstates power to legislate on the same matters but, according to the
federal paramountcy rule, federal legislation will override the
member-state legislation where they conflict. In other federations,
such as Canada, the national dimensions theory,"' if systematically
applied, might eventually lead to the same result.
In short, almost all federal states benefit internally, from a strict
legal point of view, from concluding international treaties on matters
which normally fall under member-states' jurisdiction, such as water
management and development. Thus, federalism may be a factor
which fosters international co-operation. This idea of federalism as a
factor favoring international co-operation in water is at the heart of
the second part of this paper.
FEDERALISM, A FACTOR WHICH MAY PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION ON INLAND WATER RESOURCES
Federalism is and has been a source of inspiration to the international water lawyer, planner and policy-maker. Interstate cooperation on interstate waters has been one of the sources for
46. Brower, International Law as an Instrument of National Policy, 3 Denver J. Int'l. L.
& Pol. 285 (1973).
47. Under this theory, an issue which is of national importance due to urgency, seriousness, or scope of the problem, may be regulated by the federal government. Alh6riti6re, La
gestion des eaux en droit constitutionnel canadien 145 (Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1976);
L'Ecuyer, Les dimensions nationales et la gestion de l'eau, 13(2) Cahiers de droit 231
(1972). The fact that a matter was dealt with in an international treaty might classify it as a
matter of national dimensions. Gibson, Constitutional Jurisdiction over Environmental
Management in Canada, 23 U. Toronto L.J. 54 (1973); Lederman, Legislative Power to
Implement Treaty Obligations in Canada in J. Aitchison, The Political Process in Canada
171 (1963).
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international water law and interstate water institutions have served
as models in the establishment of international bodies to administer
international rivers and lakes. At both levels, interstate and international, achievements may be attributed to the same elements, and
shortcomings may be explained by the same reasons. The evolution
of problems, and legal and institutional solutions are rather similar at
each level. And, most important of all, it may be possible to demonstrate that this parallelism in the past will continue into the future.
The findings of federal experience could considerably help those who
are committed to developing co-operation at the international level.
However, one must immediately avoid placing excessive hopes in
such comparative studies. It is largely utopian to put too much hope
in using the interstate experience of some federal countries to build
up international relations between countries with a different constitutional r6gime or with a different socio-economic background.
While interprovincial experience in Canada and interstate experience
in the U.S.A. could largely serve these two countries in their own
international relations between one another, their experience is likely
to be much less relevant to Franco-Spanish relations (two very centralized, developed countries) or to Indo-Bangladesh relations.
Another contribution that federalism may make to international
co-operation concerns the definition of the very nature of the role
that international bodies may play in the development of co-operation on water resources. Here, the role of the federal government in a
federation will be the source of inspiration.
International law is generally less sophisticated and technically
more primitive than national law. Water law is no exception. International water law has only shown vitality in the last hundred years.
However, interstate water law in federations is one of the youngest
branches of national water law, and in many federations, like
Canada, it is still non-existent. In federations where interstate water
law has developed, largely India and U.S.A., this development has
more than once helped in the definition of guidelines for international water law. In this way, federalism may foster international
co-operation on water resource issues. A priori, federal experience
can be used as an example or precedent at the international stage.
Nothing, and certainly not the law, would prevent such a transfer of
knowledge.'4
Before becoming an international legal precept, the principle of
48. This approach was followed by the tribunal in the famous Trail Smelter case. Utton,

Some Suggestions for the Management of InternationalRiver Basins, I.W.R.A., II Annales
Juris Aquarum 914, 917 (1976); Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13 Nat. Res. J.
282, 289 (1973).
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peaceful settlement of disputes4 9 by agreement was a fundamental
constitutional rule of any federal regime.5 0 The stipulation of the
1291 intercantonal treaty between the cantons of Uri, Schwyz and
Unterwalden may be regarded as an early source of inspiration for
the modern practice of international arbitration.' Interstate water
law in the U.S.A. was a factor in the weakening of the Harmon
doctrine. 5 2 Twelve years after Attorney General Harmon delivered
his opinion, the United States Supreme Court established the rule of
equitable apportionment. 5 3 This rule was later refined and developed at interstate level, be it in the United States,5 India,"5 or
becoming the cornerstone of the law of interGermany, 6 before
5 7
national rivers.
More broadly, the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty 5 I and
the principle sic utere tuo were clearly part of inter-cantonal law in
Switzerland before being one of the points of departure of modern
international law. Thus, in 1878 the federal court settled a dispute
on public waters between the cantons of Aargau and Zilrich by explaining how the principle of equality of the cantons could limit
49. U.N. Charter art. 33 para. 1.
50. Huber, The InternationalLaw of Switzerland, 3 Am. J. Int'l. L. 62, 87 (1909).
51. Id. at68.
52. Austin, Canadian-UnitedStates Practice and Theory Respecting the International
Law of InternationalRivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine,
37 Can. Bar Rev. 393,432 (1959).
53. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
54. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660 (1931).
55. Disputes relating to the sharing of Godavari waters (States of Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Mysore, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa), Krishna waters (Maharashtra, Mysore and
Andhre Pradesh) and Narmada waters (Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra), Ministry of Irrigation and Power (India), Report of the Irrigation Commission 1972,
vol. 1, at 346 (1972).
56. In 1927 the Deutsches staatsgerichtshof adjudicated a dispute between Wurttemberg,
Prussia and Baden. The court indicated that "general principles of international law concerning the flow of international rivers" supported the principle that Baden had no right to
use the waters of a natural waterway in a manner which was injurious to Wurttemberg and
Prussia. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-28), as
cited in Van Alystyne, InternationalLaw and Interstate River Disputes, 48 Calif. L. Rev.
596, 609 (1960).
57. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in (Garretson, Hayton & Olmstead) supra note 27, at
15; Dickstein, InternationalLake and River Pollution Control: Questions of Method, 12
Colum. J. of Transnat'l. L. 487, 492-94 (1973).
58. See U.N. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972. UN DOC. A/CONF. 48/14/REV.1, at 5. Principle 21 states:
"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."
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their sovereignties. 5 9 The limits of sovereignty were further explained in Aargau v. Solothurn in 1892.60 Even the famous Helsinki Rules6 I could, to a certain extent, be found in proposals
advanced for solution of interstate problems in federal countries.
Thus, Professor Cano's proposals for the Rio Colorado in Argentina6 2 contained, as early as 1956, many elements of article V of the
Rules.
The International Court of Justice, along with the United Nations,
has recognized that co-operation rather than judicial settlement is
more effective in dealing with international water problems.6 The
idea that co-operation must be the answer has been developed by
federal courts. In Canada, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 6 4 the Supreme Court6 s and legal theorists6 6 have constantly
called for interprovincial and federal provincial co-operation. Even in
federations where judicial machinery permits the settlement of interstate disputes, as in the U.S.A., the courts have always advised
member-states to rely on co-operation rather than on judicial settlement of conflicts. Co-operation is generally effected by joint bodies.
An analysis of interstate achievements will show us that the idea
of establishing a supranational drainage basin commission is still
largely utopian and may be, if we refer to interstate experience,
unnecessary.
Here again, one may have doubts about the possibility of gaining
anything from interstate experience which could benefit international relations. However, a cautious analogy seems to be feasible.
When signing compacts, member-states of a federation act almost as
independent nations, in the sense that they are sovereign in their own
spheres of government. Technical, economic and other aspects of
river basin planning and management are pertinent both to interstate
and international units. The same basic reasons and goals, mainly
economic growth, lead independent countries or member-states of a
federation to develop shared water resources. In both cases, indepen59. Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the Swiss FederalCourt in Intercantonal
Disputes, 15 Am. J. Int'l. L. 149, 170 (1921).
60. R.O.18, 701 (1892), as cited in Schindler, note 59 supra at 172.
61. For the text of the Rules and a useful commentary on their significance, see Int'l. L.
Ass'n., Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of InternationalRivers, in Rep't. of the
Fifty-second Conference, Helsinki 1966 at 484 (1967).
62. Cano, La ConferenciaSobre el Rto Colorado, La Prensa (August 22, 1956).
63. Lac Lanoux (1957); 62 R.G.D.I.P. 79 (1958).
64. Montr6al v. Montr6al Street Railways, [1912] A.C. 333 (P.C.); Attorney-General of
Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario [ 19371 A.C. 326 (P.C.).
65. In Re the Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934 [19361 Can. S. Ct. R. 398.
66. Stamp, The Constitutional Aspects of Water Pollution and the Need for Governmental Cooperation, Gibson, supra note 11.
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dent planning and management generally reduce the benefits which
could have been expected from joint development. Political boundaries, whether interstate or international, do not follow water-shed
limits.
The Two-Tier Period which, in Professor Utton's archeology of
international drainage basins,6 I is occurring now at the international
level, has reached maturity at the interstate level; the period of regulatory commissions developed to administer drainage basins on the
basis of equitable utilization is a reality in some federations, 6 8 while
it is still largely in the process of formulation at the international
level.
Professor Utton explains that the main weakness of current international legal principles relating to water is not the general nature of
the concepts involved, but the primitive state of the institutions
which apply them. 6 9 At a time when institutions rather than detailed legal principles seem lacking, it is interesting to follow the
evolution in federal countries of some interstate administrations dealing with water. Important interstate river administrations exist in
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States and India. 7
Early interstate compacts or institutions were mainly devoted to
specific water uses. This was the case with one of the first water
compacts in the United States, the Delaware River Compact of 1786,
which was concerned with navigation. Other examples involving
navigation, power and other single purpose projects could be found
in the early days of interstate co-operation on water resources. 7 1
More recent authorities are now multi-purpose oriented and deal
with water quality control for all uses, 7 2 regional planning 7 3 or
over-all water development and management. 7 4 It should nevertheless be pointed out that many recent interstate agencies were created
67. Utton, supra note 48, at 313.
68. It is the heart of the Canada Water Act, Can. Rev. Stat., C.5, annex 1 (1970).

69. Utton, in I.A.W.L. supra note 48, at 921.
70. For a partial analytical list: Cano, The Legal Basis of Integrated Utilization and
Conservation of Water Resources, in U.N., Inter-Regional Seminar on Integrated Utilization
of Water Resources, Lecture No. A.I., 42-44 (E.S.A., 1966).
71. The Council of State Governments, Interstate Compacts, 1783-1970: A Compilation
(1971).
72. Curlin, The Interstate Water Pollution Compact-PaperTiger or Effective Regulatory
Device?, 2 Ecol. L.Q. 333, 356 (1972).
73. See, information given on the Hudston River Valley Compact (1966) and the Ohio
Valley Compact (1961), Interstate Compacts, 1783-1970, supra note 71, at 28-29.
74. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 84 U.S. Stat. 1509 (1970). Among the more
successful interstate compacts in the United States have been those which relate to water;
one concerning the Delaware River Basin Compact created a Commission for the "planning,
use and control of the water and related natural resources of the Delaware River Basin,
including flood control, pollution...." 75 U.S. Stats. 688-716 (1961).
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for a single purpose 7 s or for administering only a part of the drainage basin, 7 6 demonstrating that it is not always desirable to follow
the notion of multi-purpose development or the concept of drainage
basin.
The river basin concept has spurred the emergence of a new type
of administrative unit in both federal and centralized countries, the
valley authority. This trend also became clear at the international
level in the sixties. 7 7 However, in areas of acute shortage, the role of
the river basin has been clallenged by interbasin water transfers and
sub-basin development schemes. While federalism may be an additional obstacle to interbasin transfer, 7 8 it has been favorable to subbasin development.
Federalism is partly responsible for the fact that the concept of
the drainage basin as the ideal unit for over-all regional development
is losing its fascination for the planners. Federalism has proved that,
in some instances, partial and sub-basin schemes are an easier, and in
the long run more efficient solution than an unlikely, comprehensive
integrated inter-jurisdictional drainage basin development. Agreement has been reached, with satisfactory results, on a major part of
the basin where to try to include the whole basin would have unduly
multiplied the difficulties.
In many cases, interstate co-operation on water resources has been
carried on by interstate compacts without an agency being set up.
Thus, in 1841, the Swiss cantons of Schwyz and Ztirich signed an
agreement on the use of the river Sihl. 9 Since this early example,
Swiss cantons have signed agreements for co-operation on inland
waters without establishing a joint commission." 0 The decision not
to establish an agency is sometimes a deliberate choice designed to
avoid creating an additional body which would add to the institutional labyrinth.8 (There may be a lesson here for international
75. See, The Tennessee-Tanbighee Waterway Development Compact (1957), in Interstate

Compacts, 1783-1970, supra note 71, at 25.
76. See Upper Mississippi River Compact (1967), in Interstate Compacts, 1793-1970,
supra note 71, at 30.

77. Teclaff, The Influence of Recent Trends in Water Legislation on the Structure and
Functions of Water Administration, 9 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1974).
78. There are major constitutional difficulties in India which delay the completion of a
national water grid and which may hold up the Ganga-Cauvery canal project.

79. Cano, supra note 4.
80. Among the most recent is the Convention intercantonale entre les cantons de Fri.

bourg, Vaud, Neuchbtel, Berne et Soleure concernant I'entretien en commun de l'oeuvre
intercantonale de ta Ileme correction des eaux du Jura, concluded in 1973 and approved by
the federal council in June 1975, feulle fbddrale 390 (1975).
81. MacNeil, To Commission or Not Commission: A Case Study-the South Saskatch-

ewan Project, 5 Can. Pub. Ad. 289 (1962).
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co-operation.) Whether or not a compact includes the establishment
of a commission, its success depends ultimately on the good will of
the states in ratifying them and in providing adequate resources to
implement them.
Another way to co-operate other than by compact 8 2 is to adopt
parallel legislation. Here again, interstate experience may inspire international practice. Thus, by 1944, the states of Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and New York promulgated similar water pollution control
laws. I At the international level, this technique is to be used between Canada and the United States as a follow-up to the 1972
Agreement on the Great Lakes.8 4
Another matter which is currently of great concern is the role that
international organizations could or should play in order to enhance
international co-operation on inland waters. Here again federal experiences could be of considerable help. In federations like Canada or
India, where water management is to a large extent reserved for the
exclusive legislative powers of member-states, the federal government
is in the position of an international organization vis-h-vis sovereign
independent states. Yet, in such federations, the federal government
always manages to play a decisive role in the field of water management.
The federal government intervenes in water development schemes
as a banker, making use of its spending power to benefit one chosen
scheme rather than another. Some international organizations such as
the World Bank are in the same position at the international level. I
The role of banker has probably the same beneficial and harmful
effects at the international as at the national level. In using its spending power, a federal government tends to favor interstate projects
rather than intrastate ones, just as an international organization may
tend to promote international rather than national projects. This
financial intervention is in most cases a decisive factor in the fate of
highly beneficial joint schemes and, in this respect, one can see an
analogy between the role that the Canadian Federal Government
played in the development of the Saskatchewan River through the
three Prairies Provinces and the role played by the World Bank in the
development of the Indus River. In both cases, co-operation was in a
82. About interstate agreements which are not strictly compacts in the sense given to this
word by American constitutional law, see Reisman & Simson, InterstateAgreements in the

American FederalSystem, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 70 (1973).
83. Penn. Stat. 422 (1943), N.Y. Stat. 1457 (1943), N.J. Stat. 328 (1944); for other
examples see Cano, supra note 4.
84. Supra note 47.
85. Baxter, The Indus Basin, Garretson, Hayton, Olmsted, supra note 27.
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blind alley; the first Prairies Provinces Water Board had failed, mainly
for financial reasons due to the lack of participation by the Federal
Government; in India, member-states depend on the Union for 50 to
80% of the financial help needed for the realization of their water
schemes; while in Canada the Federal Government contributes about
50% to the costs of interprovincial agreements to which it is a
party; 8 6 its contribution may, in certain cases, cover the entire
8
cost. 7
Spending power may have the same harmful effects at both interstate and international levels. In both cases, priority may be given to
projects, whose only merit is to be partially financed or subsidized
by a third party, when the state's attention should not have been
diverted from local or national projects which promised greater social
or economic returns." 8 The other danger with financial intervention
by a federal government to settle interstate disputes could be to
encourage intransigence and lead to a situation where the federal
government would be blamed if it were not in a position to give
financial help to the parties.
Federalism cannot be the only, or even the main, term of reference
for building up rules of conduct or designing better international
relations in the area of water resources. Even in new fields of investigation where an analogical approach is most needed, for instance in
the growing field of international ground-water law, other sources of
inspiration may appear much more appropriate. In developing law on
international aquifers, it is likely that, at a global level, it will be
more beneficial to adapt international surface water law to ground
water than to draw on recent experiences developed for interstate
aquifers of federal countries. However, interstate ground-water law in
the U.S.A. or in Canada could certainly be useful in solving international ground-water problems between these two countries., 9
Here again the Delaware River Basin Commission provides an interesting experience. The Compact gives the Commission powers to
publish rules and regulations for the control of pollution in surface
and ground waters. It also empowers the Commission to control
withdrawals from surface and ground waters. Since 1964 the Commission has developed its policies and taken many appropriate
86. This was the case for the Qu'Appelle River Agreement (1970-73), the Prairie Provinces Apportionment Agreement (1969), the Churchill River Agreement (1973-75), see

Environment Canada, The Canada Water Act Annual Rep't., 1973-74 (1974).
87. Peace-Athabasca Delta study (1971-72), Id. at 13.
88. INCYTH-CELA, supra note 15.
89. Morse, Model Water Resources Programsfor InternationalBoundaries of the United
States and Canada, 12 Nat. Res. J. 388, 403-04 (1972).
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actions to protect ground waters. 90 Setting aside experiences such as
that of the Delaware and Susquehanna, little effort has been put into
interstate ground-water compacts, in spite of the urgent need for
them in some areas. 9 I This need also exists at international level and,
in the absence of interstate examples, 92 new sources of inspiration
will have to be found. 9 3

CONCLUSION
It can be said that federalism as a factor influencing international
relations on inland water resources favors rather than hinders such
relations. Interstate experience may demonstrate that no detailed
legal rules are needed to frame and guide the co-operative process,
although a minimum understanding of the rules of the game and the
presence in the background of strong, general, broad, legal principles
is necessary. In this connection, it is possible that the threat that the
Canada Water Act may represent to provincial autonomy on water
matters is an incentive to interprovincial co-operation. In the same
order of ideas, the authority that some constitutional regimes entrust
to the federal courts to solve water disputes may be an incentive to
interstate co-operation, to the extent that member-states may prefer
a joint settlement to a judicial one.
Interstate experience has shown that bilateral arrangements may
often be more suitable than approaches made at the federal level and
applied to all member-states. Also, governments often prefer informal, loose, co-operative arrangements to formal legal frameworks.
The technique of using joint technical boards rather than permanent
political interstate agencies to carry out co-operation has proved to
be very attractive. 9 4 All these conclusions, which emerge from interstate experience in Canada, are reached at the international level by
Professor Bilder in his outstanding study on United States-Canadian
co-operation. 95
90. Wright, Administrative and Legal Considerations: an Interstate Viewpoint, paper
submitted to Water Resources Engineering Educational Series-Groundwater Pollution, New
York City (November 6-8, 1973).
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author gives only one example of interstate compact encompassing groundwater at 522 (The
Upper Niobrara River Compact).
93. Burman & Cornish, Needed: A Ground-Water Treaty Between the United States and
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In federations, the diversity of river commissions should once
again demonstrate the fact that each river, each water body is an
individual case and that a pragmatic approach should be followed.
Legal instruments have therefore to be adapted to each situation for,
as Brierly wrote more than thirty years ago:
Experience has shown that special river commissions, each with its
powers and duties laid down in an appropriate convention, are a
more suitable method of regulating the uses of rivers than a general
law of rivers could ever be. 9 6
In this respect, interstate law is of considerable help to international co-operation since it demonstrates the necessity to develop
original solutions for every conflict. In allocating the water of interstate rivers, the United States Supreme Court has often delivered
judgments which may appear contradictory, for instance accepting
water diversion by an upstream state in one case and rejecting it in
another.9 I Future implementation of the Helsinki Rules would also
probably lead to apparent contradictions. There are so many variables to be taken into account under article 5 of the Rules that each
case would very likely receive its own, original solution. Flexibility
has been well understood among states in a federation, it would be
one of the greatest achievements in the water management field if it
is accepted by the members of the international community. Interstate experience will then emerge as a precious reference.
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